Suez Crisis (All Parts): Causes, Conflict and Global Repercussions

Here’s a sanitized version of the provided YouTube transcript:

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In 1956, a dispute over the Suez Canal in Egypt led to an international crisis and war. Two fading colonial powers, Britain and France, expected an easy victory over Egypt but were forced into a humiliating withdrawal as the world’s new superpowers flexed their muscles. This was a stark sign that the age of European imperialism was over and that a new international order had taken its place.

Little remembered today, the events of 1956 had huge consequences for Britain, France, the Arab world, Israel, and the United States. This is the story of the Suez Crisis, whose fallout shaped world affairs for decades to come.

In 1869, world navigation was transformed by the opening of the Suez Canal. This 100-mile man-made waterway through the Egyptian desert cut 5,000 miles off the voyage from Europe to Asia, as ships no longer had to sail around Africa. Its construction, overseen by French diplomat Ferdinand de Lesseps, took 10 years and cost the lives of many thousands of Egyptian laborers. The Suez Canal Company, which owned and ran the canal, was a private company owned by shareholders, including French, Austrian, and Russian investors, as well as the ruler of Egypt, Ismail Pasha. In 1875, to pay off his debts, the Khedive sold his 44% share in the canal company to the British government. As the world’s greatest imperial and naval power, Britain had initially opposed the canal, seeing it as a potential threat, but soon proved to be its greatest beneficiary.

Eighty percent of the ships that used the canal were British, and it became a vital link to the British Empire’s eastern colonies, particularly India. Control of the canal and the security of Egypt became a vital British strategic concern. In 1882, when Egyptian anger and European interference exploded into a nationalist revolt led by Colonel Ahmad Urabi, the British sent a military force to intervene. The Egyptian army was swept aside, and Egypt effectively became a British protectorate for the next 60 years. British control of the Suez Canal was a major strategic advantage in both World Wars.

However, in the wake of victory in World War II, the British Empire was in retreat. India, Pakistan, and Burma gained their independence, and there were revolts against British rule in Malaysia, Kenya, and Cyprus. Egypt had received formal independence in 1922, but Britain continued to station troops there and govern much of the country’s affairs. Only in 1947 did British troops withdraw to the so-called Canal Zone under an earlier deal with Egypt’s King Farouk, allowing British forces to remain until 1956. However, Egyptians were turning against Farouk, blaming him for failing to prevent the creation of Israel and for Egypt’s defeat in the Arab-Israeli war that followed. They also blamed him for allowing British troops to remain in Egypt. In the Canal Zone, British soldiers and civilians faced increasing hostility from the local population, leading to riots and violence.

By 1952, a group of nationalist Egyptian army officers known as the Free Officers Movement had had enough. They seized power in a military coup, forcing King Farouk to abdicate and live in exile in Italy. The following year, Egypt was declared a republic. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged as the new leader and president of Egypt, a committed and charismatic Arab nationalist determined to free Egypt from foreign influence.

In the 1950s, America and the West were engaged in a standoff with the Soviet Union known as the Cold War, which divided Europe between communist and capitalist blocs. Each side tried to win friends and limit the other’s influence. Egypt, the largest and most powerful Arab state, would be a valuable prize for either side, but which way would President Nasser turn? U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower wanted to win over Nasser but couldn’t grant his request for a major arms deal, as they would likely be used against Israel, which had many supporters in the U.S. Instead, the U.S. and Britain offered to fund the construction of the Aswan Dam, a centerpiece of Nasser’s plan to modernize the Egyptian economy. Britain also agreed to remove its troops from the Suez Canal Zone by June 1956.

However, border tensions between Israel and its neighbors boiled over when the Israeli army attacked Egyptian-controlled Gaza, killing 38 Egyptian soldiers. This raid made Nasser determined to rapidly strengthen and modernize Egypt’s army. Since the U.S. wouldn’t help, Nasser turned to the Soviet bloc and signed a major deal to purchase modern tanks and aircraft from Czechoslovakia. This deal was seen as a huge triumph across the Arab world. Nasser further antagonized America by establishing diplomatic relations with communist China. For Eisenhower, chasing an alliance with Nasser was proving to be a major headache, and the U.S. and British offer to fund the Aswan Dam was withdrawn, a move that would have serious global repercussions.

On July 26, 1956, Nasser stunned the world by announcing that Egypt would nationalize the Suez Canal Company. He declared, “We dug the canal with our lives, our skulls, our bones, our blood. The money is ours, and the Suez Canal belongs to us.” Nasser intended to fund the Aswan Dam himself with profits from the canal company. His speech received an ecstatic response from the people of Egypt.

Nasser’s move was entirely legal, as the company’s shareholders would be bought out at fair prices. Yet his decision triggered an international crisis and a new era in the balance of world power. In Britain, Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden responded with fury to what he saw as a major attack on British national interests. Fifteen thousand ships a year came through the Suez Canal, bringing vital resources that the British economy couldn’t survive without. Eden believed Nasser had his thumb on Britain’s windpipe.

Eden, who had made his reputation by opposing appeasement, convinced himself that Nasser was another dictator that Britain had to face down. French Prime Minister Guy Mollet agreed with Eden’s assessment and had an additional reason to want Nasser gone, as France was fighting a bitter war in Algeria against nationalist rebels trained and supplied by Nasser. Britain and France secretly began planning a military operation to seize control of the Suez Canal, remove Nasser from power, and reaffirm their status as major global powers.

That summer, under pressure from the Americans, Eden agreed to host an international conference in a last effort to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. At the Lancaster House conference in London, 22 nations were represented, but only Egypt and Greece declined the invitation. Eighteen of the 22 nations supported Britain and France’s position that the Suez Canal be returned to international ownership, a proposal turned down flat by President Nasser. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told the British that America would not support an attack on Egypt, believing that military action against Nasser would push the entire Arab world into the arms of the Soviets. President Eisenhower was also running for re-election and did not welcome the distraction, a warning that Eden fatefully ignored.

Britain and France had already chosen the path to war, but it was not them that struck first against Nasser; it was Israel. On October 29, Israeli paratroopers landed in the Egyptian Sinai, seizing the strategic Mitla Pass and paving the way for an invasion by ground forces. At the U.N., Israel insisted it was acting in self-defense against raids by Palestinian fighters known as fedayeen operating from bases in Gaza and Sinai. However, there were no fedayeen bases in Sinai.

Britain and France, claiming to act on behalf of the international community, issued an ultimatum to both sides to stop fighting within 12 hours and withdraw all forces 10 miles from the Suez Canal or they would intervene to enforce compliance. Egypt was effectively being told to abandon the Sinai and the canal. Israel accepted the terms; Nasser refused. So, on October 31, British and French aircraft began bombing Egyptian airfields and infrastructure.

However, not all was as it seemed. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had been considering an attack on Egypt for many months and was encouraged by Moshe Dayan, the commander of Israel’s armed forces. Nasser did not view the new Jewish state as legitimate, and with modern weapons from Czechoslovakia, he was seen as a potential threat to Israel’s survival. They were also determined to end Egypt’s blockade of the Straits of Tehran, which prevented Israeli access to the Red Sea.

France wanted to ally with Israel to get rid of Nasser, but British Prime Minister Eden was anxious about being seen as the aggressor. The French proposed a secret meeting near Paris, where representatives of Britain, France, and Israel planned a war. Israel would invade Egypt, allowing Britain and France to pose as peacemakers and issue an ultimatum they knew only Israel would accept. Then, claiming to act to safeguard the canal, they would invade Egypt and overthrow Nasser, although they had no real plan for what to do once he was gone.

On November 5, after a week of bombing and with Israeli troops winning in Sinai, British and French paratroopers were dropped onto targets around Port Said and Port Fuad at the mouth of the Suez Canal. Once on the ground, they quickly seized Egyptian airfields and key infrastructure. The next morning, under cover of airstrikes and naval bombardment, British and French landings began. Fierce street fighting ensued, but the Egyptians were massively outgunned, leading to a one-sided contest. Around 600 Egyptian soldiers and police were killed, while British and French deaths totaled just 26. Egyptian civilians suffered the most, with up to 1,000 losing their lives and many more left homeless by air raids and shelling.

By the end of the day, the British and French were in control, but they couldn’t prevent the Egyptians from sabotaging the Suez Canal itself, sinking ships in its narrow channel and putting it out of action for several months. It was clear that the British, French, and Israelis were working together, and at the United Nations, world opinion quickly turned against them. For once, the U.S. and Soviet Union were united in condemnation. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev even threatened to fire rockets at Paris and London.

President Eisenhower thought the invasion had no moral or legal justification and was furious with Britain for going behind his back. The British and French governments delivered a 12-hour ultimatum to Israel and Egypt, which was followed by armed attacks against Egypt. Eisenhower wanted international attention focused on Hungary, where Soviet troops were brutally crushing a popular uprising. Instead, Britain and France’s reckless intervention was likely to push Arab states closer to the Soviet Union.

In the U.N. Security Council, Britain and France used their veto to block resolutions that criticized Israel’s attack on Egypt or their own intervention. However, with both superpowers condemning their actions, they faced a vote in the General Assembly and the threat of U.N. sanctions. Britain’s economy had been fragile before the crisis began, and now market fears caused the British currency to crash, threatening economic disaster. Only a massive loan from the International Monetary Fund could save Britain, but Eisenhower blocked any IMF aid until Britain agreed to a U.N.-backed ceasefire in Egypt.

Eden, facing growing opposition at home and from within his own government, had few options. Just two days after British troops landed in Egypt, they announced a ceasefire. The French, abandoned by their ally, had no choice but to follow suit. Within days, the U.N.’s first major peacekeeping operation got underway as Danish U.N. troops arrived in Egypt to take over from the British and French.

As they packed up and returned home, it was officially a job well done, but in truth, Suez had been a humiliating fiasco. The political leadership had been reckless, the military objectives confused, and as soon as international pressure mounted, the British had no option but to abort the entire mission. That winter, under intense American pressure, Israeli forces also withdrew from Sinai.

The Suez Crisis forced Britain and France to accept that they were now second-ranked powers. No longer could they act as they wished on the world stage without first considering the views of the United States. The lesson taken by the British was never again to jeopardize their so-called special relationship with America. For France, the lesson was that Britain and America were unreliable allies, and their interests were better served by closer ties within Europe.

Israel achieved some objectives, including the opening of the Straits of Tehran to Israeli shipping, but with Nasser still in power, future conflict with Egypt and its other Arab neighbors was almost certain. The Sinai War proved to be a precursor to the far more decisive Six-Day War fought a decade later.

British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden’s career and health were ruined; he resigned but not before lying to Parliament about his knowledge of the secret deal with Israel. Nasser, hailed as a hero in the Arab world for standing up to European imperialism, had, in reality, been saved by U.S. and U.N. intervention. His modernizing reforms and opposition to foreign intervention mean his memory is still revered by Arabs across the Middle East.

The impact of the Suez Crisis on America was perhaps the most far-reaching. The collapse of British and French prestige among Arab nations meant the U.S. would now take the lead in countering Soviet expansion in the Middle East and securing the West’s oil supplies. The Suez Crisis would accelerate U.S. involvement in this volatile region, with consequences stretching well into the 21st century.

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